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Lopsided Lives
THERON PUMMER
1. Pluralism about well-being
If you are at all like me, lots of things are good for you: pleasure, desire
satisfaction, knowledge, friendship, love, rationality, freedom, moral
virtue, health, sunshine, money, gothic architecture, and mint chocolate
chip ice cream. Acquiring things that are good for you contributes
positively to the overall well-being score of your life (that is, it increases
how well off you are overall).1 By contrast, acquiring things that are bad
for you contributes negatively the overall well-being score of your life.
Some things are non-derivatively good for you: their presence in your
life makes a positive contribution to the overall well-being score of your
life independently of their contribution to the presence of other things in
your life. Plausibly pleasure is non-derivatively good for you. Some things
are derivatively good for you: their presence in your life contributes to the
presence of other things in your life that are in turn non-derivatively good
for you. Plausibly mint chocolate chip ice cream is at most merely deriva-
tively good for you: it is derivatively good for you insofar as it contributes
to the presence of things in your life that are non-derivatively good for you
(like pleasure), but it is not itself non-derivatively good for you.
This chapter is about what is non-derivatively good for individuals.
Intuitively there are many different types of things non-derivatively good
for individuals: pleasure, desire satisfaction, knowledge, friendship, love,
rationality, freedom, moral virtue, and appreciation of true beauty.
According to pluralism about well-being, there are at least two different
types of things non-derivatively good for individuals (most pluralists
believe there are more than two).2 Pluralism opposes monism, according
1 For introductions to well-being, see Crisp (2015) and Bradley (2015).
2 Objective List Views are pluralist views (assuming there are at least two items on the list); see
Parﬁt (1984), Fletcher (2016), Lin (2016a), and Arneson (2016).
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to which there is only one type of thing non-derivatively good for
individuals. Hedonism is the monistic view according to which pleasure
is the only thing non-derivatively good for individuals, and pain is the
only thing non-derivatively bad for individuals.3
Most pluralists accept that pleasure is non-derivatively good for individ-
uals. I assume they are correct in doing so. Thus, pluralists disagree with
hedonists not over whether pleasure is non-derivatively good for individuals,
butwhether it is the only such thing. In this chapter, I present a new challenge
for pluralism, which functions equally as a new argument for hedonism.
2. Hedonic lopsidedness
Let us say that the amount of hedonic goodness a life contains is a function
of the pleasure and pain it contains, and that the amount of nonhedonic
goodness a life contains is a function of the things of a nonhedonic
variety putatively non-derivatively good for individuals it contains (e.g.,
desire satisfaction, knowledge, friendship, love, rationality, etc.).4 That a
life contains X amount of hedonic goodness or Y amount of nonhedonic
goodness does not automatically tell us how, if at all, these factors contrib-
ute to the life’s overall well-being score. That is a substantive question.
As all philosophy undergraduates learn, hedonism has intuitively incor-
rect implications about the experience machine.5 Consider an improved
version of this famous example. Life A contains a lot of desire satisfaction,
knowledge, friendship, love, rationality, and appreciation of true beauty. In
other words, life A contains a lot of nonhedonic goodness. But life A also
contains a lot of pleasure, and little if any pain. LifeB is phenomenologically
indistinguishable from life A, owing to a supercomputer’s ﬂawless simula-
tion of the phenomenology of life A. So life B contains exactly as much
pleasure and pain as life A.6 But, since the entirety of life B is spent plugged
in to this super-duper simulation, plausibly it contains little if any desire
3 Contemporary defenders of hedonism include Crisp (2006), Bradley (2009), and Singer
and de Lazari-Radek (2014).
4 I am not assuming that these functions must be additive.
5 This is Crisp’s (2006: 118) improved version of Nozick’s (1974: 42–3) famous thought-
experiment. One of the respects in which Crisp’s version of the example is an improvement over
Nozick’s is that it better avoids status quo bias issues of the sort discussed in De Brigard (2010).
Also see Lin (2016b).
6 I am sympathetic to a qualia-based view of the metaphysics of pleasure and pain, as
opposed to an attitude-based view; see Crisp (2006).
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satisfaction, knowledge, friendship, and so on. While they have the same
amounts of hedonic goodness, life A has muchmore nonhedonic goodness
than life B. Hedonism implies that these lives have the same overall well-
being score, but, intuitively, life A has a higher overall well-being score.
Pluralism can capture this intuitive claim with ease.
Lopsided lives score very low in terms of some types of goodness, but
very high in terms of other types of goodness. Life B plausibly is a lopsided
life, exhibiting a kind of hedonic lopsidedness. In this chapter I will focus
on lopsided lives that suffer from a different kind of hedonic lopsidedness:
they score very low in terms of hedonic goodness, but very high in terms of
nonhedonic goodness. For example, such a life might contain very little
pleasure, a lot of pain, and a lot of desire satisfaction, knowledge, friend-
ship, and rationality. Contemplating a range of such hedonically lopsided
lives might lead us to claim that any plausible theory of well-being must
accommodate one or both of the following constraints.
No Pleasure, No Well-Being (NPNW): Any life that contains no
pleasure cannot have a positive overall well-being score, no matter
how much nonhedonic goodness it contains.
There is disagreement about the plausibility of NPNW.7Whether or not
NPNW is plausible, the following constraint seems more plausible:
Enough Pain, Limited Well-Being (EPLW): Any life that contains
no pleasure and at least ﬁnite amount of pain P cannot have an overall
well-being score that exceeds ﬁnite limit L, no matter how much
nonhedonic goodness it contains.
Agreeing that lives with certain hedonic features cannot have overall
well-being scores that exceed ﬁnite limit L is not by itself committing to
what limit L is, only that there is some such L.8
7 Obviously hedonists think that pleasureless lives cannot have positive overall well-being
scores. But some nonhedonists, like Adams (1999) and Kagan (2009), agree. Others, including
de Marneffe (2003) and Sarch (2012), disagree. Both Feldman (2004) and Crisp (2006) argue
that accommodating constraints like NPNW poses problems for pluralists; Lin (2016a) replies.
8 Moreover, agreeing that lives with certain hedonic features cannot have overall well-being
scores that exceed ﬁnite limit L is not by itself committing to the view that once these lives
contain enough nonhedonic goodness, additional nonhedonic goodness makes no contribution
to their overall well-being scores. We could instead say that the ﬁnite limit on the overall well-
being score of a life is asymptotically approached as this life’s nonhedonic goodness approaches
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Hedonism clearly entails both NPNW and EPLW. To the extent that
these constraints are plausible and cannot be accommodated by rival
views of well-being, this is to hedonism’s advantage. Indeed, EPLW does
seem plausible, and arguably pluralism is plausible only if it can accommo-
date it. But it is not necessarily the case that pluralism is plausible if it can
accommodate EPLW, as it might turn out that pluralism can accommo-
date EPLW only if it entails claims which are themselves implausible. I will
next explore whether pluralism can accommodate EPLW without incur-
ring such further implausibility.
At this point some pluralists might reply that such an exploration is
unnecessary, insisting that EPLW is not plausible. First, even if at the
end of the day EPLW should be rejected, it does have some intuitive
appeal (according to many pluralists). Second, I will in section 8 intro-
duce another constraint that is even harder to deny than EPLW. But
since most of the pluralist strategies for accommodating this harder-to-
deny constraint are analogous to the pluralist strategies for accommo-
dating EPLW, for ease of presentation I will discuss the latter ﬁrst.
3. Hypersensitivity
Again, EPLW states that any life that contains no pleasure and at least
ﬁnite amount of pain P cannot have an overall well-being score that
exceeds ﬁnite limit L, no matter how much nonhedonic goodness it
contains. Pluralists can combine EPLW with:
Enough Less Pain, Unlimited Well-Being (LPUW): Any life that
contains any ﬁnite amount of pleasure and less than ﬁnite amount of
pain P can have an overall well-being score that exceeds any ﬁnite limit
L, if its nonhedonic goodness were increased sufﬁciently (while hold-
ing ﬁxed the amount of pleasure in the life).
inﬁnity. As the amount of nonhedonic goodness the life contains approaches inﬁnity, the degree
to which additional amounts of nonhedonic goodness contribute to overall well-being
approaches zero. But for any ﬁnite amount of nonhedonic goodness in the life, additional
amounts of nonhedonic goodness will make some non-zero contribution to overall well-being.
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In other words, if a life contains less than ﬁnite amount of pain P, then as
this life’s amount of nonhedonic goodness approaches inﬁnity (holding
ﬁxed the amount of pleasure in the life), so too does its overall well-being
score. There is a problem with the pluralist’s attempt to accommodate
EPLW by embracing LPUW. Consider two more lives, life C and
life D. They both contain no pleasure and a lot of pain. However,
life C contains just slightly less than amount of pain P, whereas life
D contains exactly amount of pain P. Now suppose we can increase the
nonhedonic goodness of either life to whatever degree we like, but what-
ever nonhedonic boost we provide for life C, we must provide an exactly
similar nonhedonic boost for life D. The combination of EPLW and
LPUW imply that by giving life C and life D equivalent arbitrarily large
nonhedonic boosts, we make life C’s overall well-being score arbitrarily
greater than life D’s. But this seems implausible. Given that life C and life
D are exactly similar down to the very last detail, with the only exception
being that lifeD contains an extra tiny drop of pain, it is very hard to believe
they could differ so dramatically in terms of overall well-being. To deny this
would be to accept hypersensitivity to very slight nonevaluative differences—
that is, to accept that an arbitrarily large difference in overall well-being
scores can supervene wholly on a very slight nonevaluative difference.
It is important to stress that what I am claiming is implausible is that
arbitrarily large differences in overall well-being scores can supervene
wholly on very slight nonevaluative differences. I do not intend to rule
out the possibility of very slight nonevaluative differences making other
nonevaluative differences which are themselves fairly sizable, which in turn
very large evaluative differences can supervene on. For example, running
slightly faster can affect who will win the big race. Delaying someone by a
second can affect which children will be conceived.9 And so on. Insofar as
large evaluative differences supervene on these small nonevaluative differ-
ences, plausibly they do not wholly supervene on them, for plausibly they
also supervene on the further, larger, nonevaluative differences from which
these small initial nonevaluative differences give rise.
The sort of hypersensitivity I am focusing on here, according to which
an arbitrarily large difference in overall well-being scores can supervene
wholly on a very slight nonevaluative difference, seems implausible. At
9 See Parﬁt’s (1984) discussion of the Non-Identity Problem (note the Time-Dependence
Claim in particular, on p. 351).
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least, it seems implausible to me and to many others. I cannot offer much
of an argument against hypersensitivity here. Such an argument might
start from the more widely accepted idea that the evaluative supervenes
on the nonevaluative and move in the direction of similarity-based super-
venience constraints, according to which large evaluative differences
cannot supervene wholly on small nonevaluative differences. We might
defend a seemingly modest such constraint: arbitrarily large evaluative dif-
ferences cannot supervene wholly on very slight nonevaluative differences.10
But again, here is not the place to get into a general level discussion of such
similarity-based supervenience constraints. Claiming that the speciﬁc kind of
hypersensitivity identiﬁed in this chapter is intuitively problematic need not
commit one to any such general constraint.11
4. Indeterminacy
Pluralists can accommodate EPLW (Enough Pain, Limited Well-Being)
by adopting LPUW (Enough Less Pain, Unlimited Well-Being), but the
combination of EPLW and LPUW yields hypersensitivity. One might
respond that the derivation of hypersensitivity from EPLW and LPUW
depends on the implicit assumption that it is determinate what the
critical amount of pain P is (again, lives with amount of pain P cannot
have overall well-being scores that exceed ﬁnite limit L, no matter how
much nonhedonic goodness they contain).12 After all, hypersensitivity
10 Beckstead (unpublished manuscript) defends a similarity-based supervenience constraint.
For a discussion of similarity-based supervenience more generally, see McLaughlin (1995).
11 I assume that ﬁnding hypersensitivity implausible does not require us to havemathematically
precise measures of nonevaluative or evaluative differences. It seems sufﬁcient for my purposes that
some nonevaluative differences are intuitively slight whereas some evaluative differences are
intuitively large. We can understand the relevant nonevaluative and evaluative differences in
relative, rather than absolute, terms (in order to circumvent worries involving “miniature worlds”
that are exactly similar to ours, except dramatically smaller in absolute terms). For example, a
nonevaluative difference between two possible states of affairs is slight when they are N per cent
similar, whereN is very close to 100; an evaluative difference between two possible states of affairs is
arbitrarily large when one is M times better than the other, where M is arbitrarily large.
12 One might object to various other implicit assumptions: that lives can be assigned
numbers as overall well-being scores, and similarly that lives can be numerically ranked in
terms of hedonic and nonhedonic goodness. Several philosophers—including Chang (2002),
Temkin (2012), and Parﬁt (unpublished manuscript)—have provided interesting challenges to
the idea that goodness is measurable along a single number line. I believe that my puzzles about
lopsided lives can be restated without (many of) the numerical assumptions which, largely for
ease of presentation, I help myself to here.
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was demonstrated by comparing a life which contains just slightly less
than amount of pain P (life C) with a life which contains exactly amount
of pain P (life D). But if it is indeterminate what P is, then perhaps there
is no pair of lives that are exactly similar with the exception of a slight
difference in pain, such that one determinately sits on one side of
P whereas the other determinately sits on the other side of P. Instead,
pairs of lives that differ only slightly in the amount of pain they contain
either both determinately sit on one side of P, both determinately sit on
the other side of P, or are both of indeterminate status with respect to
which side of P they each sit. In short, the slight difference in pain between
the two lives fails to generate an asymmetry between the lives with respect
to the critical amount of pain P, and so fails to generate hypersensitivity.
This response raises complex issues to which I cannot do justice in
this chapter. Therefore I will largely just ﬂag the appeal to indeterminacy
as one possibility for the pluralist, and move on. First, note that whether
invoking indeterminacy prevents hypersensitivity depends on which
theory of indeterminacy is correct.13 If epistemicism is correct, then it
is determinate but unknowable what the critical amount of pain P is. We
could not then prevent hypersensitivity by invoking indeterminacy, as
hypersensitivity is generated independently of whether it is knowable
what P is. If instead supervaluationism is correct, then while it is indeter-
minate what the critical amount of pain P is, it is determinately true that
there is some critical amount of pain P. On this picture, while it is
indeterminate which pair of lives (exactly similar with the exception of a
slight difference in pain) is the pair such that one determinately sits on one
side of P whereas the other determinately sits on the other side of P, it is
determinately true that there is some such pair of lives. That would be
enough to generate hypersensitivity; it is simply indeterminate where
hypersensitivity is generated. This does not, to my mind, mitigate the
implausibility of hypersensitivity. So it appears that the correct theory of
indeterminacy must be non-epistemicist and non-supervaluationist for
the invocation of indeterminacy to successfully prevent hypersensitivity
(which is a nontrivial observation, given that supervaluationism is
arguably the default theory). Second, there is a growing literature on
indeterminacy and vagueness in ethics that may well interact
13 For a useful overview of competing theories of indeterminacy and vagueness, see Keefe
(2000).
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with invoking indeterminacy in the context of putative hypersensitivity.14
But I cannot wade into this literature here, nor, obviously enough, can
I here resolve which theory of indeterminacy is correct. I will now consider
other options for pluralists.
5. Enough less pain and enough pleasure
Rather than accommodating EPLW (Enough Pain, LimitedWell-Being)
by adopting LPUW (Enough Less Pain, Unlimited Well-Being), plur-
alists might attempt to accommodate EPLW by instead adopting:
Enough Less Pain, and Enough Pleasure, Unlimited Well-Being
(PPUW): Any life that contains less than ﬁnite amount of pain
P and contains at least amount of pleasure Q can have an overall
well-being score that exceeds any ﬁnite limit L, if its nonhedonic
goodness were increased sufﬁciently (while holding ﬁxed the amount
of pleasure in the life). On the other hand, any life that contains at
least ﬁnite amount of pain P and less than ﬁnite amount of pleasure
Q cannot have an overall well-being score that exceeds ﬁnite limit L,
no matter how much nonhedonic goodness it contains.15
PPUW is consistent with EPLW, but does it imply hypersensitivity?
Recall that the derivation of hypersensitivity from the conjunction of
EPLW and LPUW appealed to lives C and D, exactly similar except that
C contains just slightly less than amount of pain P, whereas life
D contains exactly amount of pain P. The combination of EPLW and
LPUW imply that by giving life C and life D equivalent arbitrarily large
nonhedonic boosts, we make life C’s overall well-being score arbitrarily
greater than life D’s. There is a similar way of deriving hypersensitivity
from PPUW: we can again take two lives, E and F, exactly similar except
that E contains just slightly less than amount of pain P and exactly
14 For example, see: Tenenbaum and Raffman (2012), Williams (2014), Elson (2015),
Schoenﬁeld (2015), Dunaway (2017), and Dougherty (forthcoming).
15 There are different possible views to take about lives that contain at least ﬁnite amount of
pain P but also contain at least ﬁnite amount of pleasure Q (or that contain less pain than P but
also contain less pleasure than Q). According to one view, whether such lives fall on one side or
the other of the critical hedonic threshold is a function of the (absolute or proportional)
difference in the amounts of pleasure and pain they contain.
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amount of pleasure Q, whereas life F contains exactly amount of pain
P and just slightly less than amount of pleasure Q. PPUW implies that
by giving life E and life F equivalent arbitrarily large nonhedonic boosts,
we make life E’s overall well-being score arbitrarily greater than life F’s.
But the collection of the two slight nonevaluative differences between
E and F itself constitutes a slight nonevaluative difference. Hypersensi-
tivity persists. Rather than PPUW, a pluralist might adopt:
Enough Less Pain, and Enough Overlapping Pleasure, Unlimited
Well-Being (PPUW*): Any life that contains less than ﬁnite amount
of pain P and is such that its individual nonhedonic goods each overlap
appropriately with pleasures each of at least ﬁnite amount R can have an
overall well-being score that exceeds any ﬁnite limit L, if its nonhedonic
goodness were increased sufﬁciently. On the other hand, any life that
contains at least ﬁnite amount of pain P and fails to meet the above
overlap requirement cannot have an overall well-being score that exceeds
ﬁnite limit L, no matter how much nonhedonic goodness it contains.16
There are different possible accounts of what constitutes appropriate
overlap between pleasure and individual nonhedonic goods: temporal
overlap, causal overlap (e.g., the pleasure is caused by the nonhedonic
goods), or psychological overlap (e.g., the pleasure is in some sense about
the nonhedonic goods). PPUW* is consistent with EPLW, but does it
imply hypersensitivity?
Consider lives G and H, exactly similar except that G contains just
slightly less than amount of pain P and is such that its individual
nonhedonic goods each overlap appropriately with pleasures each of
exactly ﬁnite amount R, whereas H contains exactly amount of pain
P and is such that its individual nonhedonic goods each overlap appropri-
ately with pleasures each just slightly less than ﬁnite amount R. PPUW*
implies that by giving life G and life H equivalent arbitrarily large non-
hedonic boosts, we make life G’s overall well-being score arbitrarily greater
than life H’s. But for any arbitrarily large ﬁnite number of additional
nonhedonic goods N, there is a very slight nonevaluative difference
16 As with PPUW, there are different possible views to take about lives that contain at least
ﬁnite amount of pain P but also meet the overlap requirement (or that contain less than P but
also fail to meet the overlap requirement).
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corresponding to the difference between amount of pleasure R and an
amount very slightly less than R such that the collection of N of these
very slight nonevaluative differences itself constitutes a slight nonevaluative
difference.17 We can tailor the example so that this is the slight none-
valuative difference between lives G and H. So hypersensitivity persists.18
Let us take stock. Pluralists can accommodate EPLW (Enough Pain,
Limited Well-Being) by adopting LPUW (Enough Less Pain, Unlimited
Well-Being). But the conjunction of EPLW and LPUW yields hyper-
sensitivity (section 3). Appealing to indeterminacy may be of no help
(section 4). PPUW and PPUW* are each consistent with EPLW, but
they each yield hypersensitivity. In general, the problem seems to be with
claiming both (1) that lives below a certain hedonic threshold cannot
have overall well-being scores that exceed ﬁnite limit L, no matter how
much nonhedonic goodness they contain, and (2) that lives above the
critical hedonic threshold can have overall well-being scores that exceed
any ﬁnite limit L, as long as they contain enough nonhedonic goodness.
These claims together yield hypersensitivity.
EPLW is a version of (1). I will now consider views which accom-
modate EPLW—and thus (1)—while rejecting (2).
6. Limits on nonhedonic goodness
It could be that EPLW is true because there are various limits on
nonhedonic goodness. First, consider:
Absolute Limits: For any given life, there is a ﬁnite limit on how
much desire satisfaction, knowledge, friendship, love, rationality,
freedom, moral virtue, appreciation of true beauty, etc., it could
contain. No life could contain an amount of nonhedonic goodness
that exceeds ﬁnite limit M.
17 Note that this move supposes that amounts of pleasure can vary continuously.
18 Some might ﬁnd hypersensitivity less implausible when the slight nonevaluative differences
in question are collections ofmany very slight nonevaluative differences. It is important to keep in
mind that here we ﬁrst ﬁx the number of very slight nonevaluative differences N and second adjust
the size of these very slight nonevaluative differences so they are each sufﬁciently slight, so that
N of them is itself slight. On the other hand, if we were to ﬁrst ﬁx the size of the very slight
nonevaluative differences and second adjust their number N, then we could get it to be the case
that N of them is itself a non-slight nonevaluative difference (by making N sufﬁciently large).
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Thus, assuming that a ﬁnite amount of nonhedonic goodness can
contribute merely ﬁnitely to a life’s overall well-being score, for any
given life that contains no pleasure, there is a ﬁnite limit L on its overall
well-being score. So, EPLW is true.
For my purposes here, it is irrelevant that, within the lives of limited
beings like us, nonhedonic goodness cannot be increased beyond some
ﬁnite limit. What is instead relevant is whether there are metaphysically
possible beings within the lives of which nonhedonic goodness can be
increased beyond any ﬁnite limit. Such beings do seem metaphysically
possible. For it is plausibly metaphysically possible that for any life of
ﬁnite length, there are beings with longer lives. But then presumably
lives can contain arbitrarily large amounts of nonhedonic goodness—
desire satisfaction, knowledge, friendship, etc.—by containing them in
their earthly amounts per time, for arbitrarily unearthly amounts of
time.19 It may also be metaphysically possible for lives to contain
arbitrarily large amounts of nonhedonic goodness in earthly amounts
of time, by containing them in unearthly amounts per time. Could an
omnipotent being not bring about as much knowledge, friendship, etc.
in a one-second-long life as it wants? Could this being not speed up all of
the relevant processes accordingly?20 The metaphysical possibilities
of living nonhedonically well over an arbitrarily long period and living
nonhedonically well arbitrarily fast would each appear sufﬁcient to put
Absolute Limits to rest. Next, consider:
Relative Limits: For any life containing ﬁnite amount of pain
X and ﬁnite amount of pleasure Y, there is a particular ﬁnite limit
M corresponding to X and Y such that this life cannot score higher
than M in terms of nonhedonic goodness. The amount of nonhedo-
nic goodness a life can contain (M) depends on the amounts of pain
(X) and pleasure (Y) the life contains.
Relative Limits, if correct, would accommodate EPLW in roughly the
same way as Absolute Limits, if correct. When considering most non-
hedonic goods—at least: desire satisfaction, knowledge, rationality,
19 There is a lot of literature on the desirability in principle of living forever, much of it
stemming fromWilliams (1978); I cannot do justice to it here, but arguably some of it interacts
with my question of whether there are limits on nonhedonic goodness.
20 See the literature on supertasks, e.g., Manchak and Roberts (2016).
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freedom—Relative Limits seems hard to believe. Suppose we have a very
(arbitrarily) long life within which to allocate pain, pleasure, and these
nonhedonic goods. Suppose we reserve one half of the life for all the pain
and pleasure, and the other half for the nonhedonic stuff. Whatever
ﬁnite amounts of pain and pleasure go into the ﬁrst half, it seems
metaphysically possible to put any ﬁnite quantity of these nonhedonic
goods into the painless and pleasureless half.
Perhaps matters are different for other nonhedonic goods, like love
and appreciation of true beauty. One might plausibly argue that the
presence of such things does depend on the presence of pleasure
(and pain). Perhaps it is metaphysically impossible to have love or
appreciation of true beauty without having any pleasure whatsoever.
Or consider taking pleasure in true beauty—or, taking pleasure in
knowledge, rationality, and so on. Clearly it is metaphysically impos-
sible to take pleasure in these things without having pleasure. Indeed,
this is conceptually impossible. We might say that things like taking
pleasure in true beauty, knowledge, rationality, etc.—for which pleas-
ure is conceptually necessary—are composite goods. These things are
neither wholly hedonic nor wholly nonhedonic, but composites of the
two. On some accounts of composite goods, it is plausible that if the
amount of pleasure in a given life is ﬁxed, then so too is the quantity of
these composite goods it could contain. That is, Relative Limits seems
plausible for these composite goods. Nonetheless, this will not help the
pluralist who believes in composite goods escape the above worries
about accommodating EPLW without hypersensitivity. Without
ruling out composite goods, it seems that for any putative composite
good we can relevantly factor it into pleasure and its wholly nonhedonic
features. Consider, for example, taking pleasure in true beauty. There is
a possible spectrum of cases where the amount of pleasure taken in true
beauty in each case is slightly less than the previous one, and where in
the ﬁnal case we are left with the wholly nonhedonic good of pleasure-
less consciousness of true beauty. Our broad question, then, is whether
and when lives with particular ﬁxed hedonic goods can have overall
well-being scores that exceed any ﬁnite limit in virtue of containing a
sufﬁcient quantity of such wholly nonhedonic goods. Since it seems
that Relative Limits for such wholly nonhedonic goods is hard to
believe, we are dialectically back where we were just before this long
paragraph began.
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7. Contributory limits
Rather than accommodating EPLW (Enough Pain, LimitedWell-Being)
by espousing limits on nonhedonic goodness per se, we might instead
espouse limits on the extent to which nonhedonic goodness can contrib-
ute to overall well-being, independently of critical hedonic thresholds of
the sort recognized by PPUW, PPUW*, and the conjunction of EPLW
and LPUW. First, consider:
Absolute Contributory Limits: For any given life, there is a ﬁnite
limit K on how much its nonhedonic goodness can contribute to its
overall well-being score, even if there is no ﬁnite limit on the amount
of nonhedonic goodness it can contain.
Thus, for any given life that contains no pleasure, there is a ﬁnite limit
L on its overall well-being score. So, EPLW is true. Second, consider:
Relative Contributory Limits: For any life containing ﬁnite amount
of pain X and ﬁnite amount of pleasure Y, there is a particular ﬁnite
limitK corresponding toX andY such that the nonhedonic goodness of
this life cannot contribute more than K to its overall well-being score,
even if there is no ﬁnite limit on the amount of nonhedonic goodness it
can contain. The amount by which a life’s nonhedonic goodness can
contribute to its overall well-being score (K) depends on the amounts of
pain (X) and pleasure (Y) the life contains.
Relative Contributory Limits, if correct, would accommodate EPLW in
roughly the same way as Absolute Contributory Limits, if correct.21
There is a feature of the pluralist’s appeal to such contributory limits—
whether AbsoluteContributory Limits or RelativeContributory Limits—to
which it is worth paying close attention. To illustrate this feature somewhat
more concretely, I will ﬁrst sketch somewhatmore concrete speciﬁcations of
Absolute Contributory Limits and Relative Contributory Limits.
According to one speciﬁcation of Absolute Contributory Limits, the
ﬁnite limit on how much any life’s nonhedonic goodness can contribute
21 Compare these contributory limits with Temkin’s Capped Model for Ideals (2012: section
10.6).
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to its overall well-being score is 1,000. Suppose this limit is approached
asymptotically. That is, as the amount of nonhedonic goodness in
any life approaches inﬁnity, the degree to which additional amounts of
nonhedonic goodness contribute to its overall well-being score
approaches zero. Suppose that any life with at least 200 units of non-
hedonic goodness is intuitively very close to this limit (the nonhedonic
goodness in a life with exactly 200 units of nonhedonic goodness
contributes 999 to its overall well-being score). Next, according to one
speciﬁcation of Relative Contributory Limits, once the amount of non-
hedonic goodness of any painless life reaches about twice the amount of
pleasure it contains, further increasing its nonhedonic goodness makes
very little difference to the life’s overall well-being score. In particular,
suppose that any painless life with 100 units of pleasure has a ﬁnite limit
of 1,000 on how much its nonhedonic goodness can contribute to its
overall well-being score. Thus, painless lives with 100 units of pleasure
with about 200 units of nonhedonic goodness are intuitively very close
to this limit, which is, again, approached asymptotically. (Obviously the
point I am about to make could be made using different numbers,
different speciﬁcations of these contributory limits views.)
Suppose that these speciﬁcations of Absolute Contributory Limits
and Relative Contributory Limits would yield the following implications
about four painless lives.
Pleasure Units Nonhedonic Units Nonhedonic Contribution
Life P 100 200 999
Life Q 100 5 300
Life V 100 20,000,000 999.999
Life W 100 500 999.99
The far-right column refers to the amount by which a life’s nonhedonic
goodness (measured by nonhedonic units) contributes to its overall well-
being score.
According to pluralists, differences in nonhedonic units at least
sometimes make a difference to overall well-being scores. The sizable
difference in the overall well-being scores of lives P and Q is responsive to
the sizable difference in their nonhedonic units, while the difference in
the overall well-being scores of lives V and W is virtually zero, despite the
fact that the difference in their nonhedonic units is much greater than
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that between lives P and Q. Far from hypersensitivity, this arguably
constitutes an implausible form of comparative insensitivity to (arbitrarily)
large differences—it seems to me and others implausible that (arbitrarily)
large differences in nonhedonic units would virtually not matter at all
in the comparison between lives V and W, assuming that these sorts of
differences do matter substantially in other comparisons.
The sort of comparative insensitivity exhibited by pluralism taken in
conjunction with contributory limits is more implausible than can be
explained in this chapter. Given reasonable assumptions about the meta-
physics of persons and lives, this comparative insensitivity gives rise to a
further kind of hypersensitivity problem, which I call life individuation
hypersensitivity. Unfortunately, I cannot explain or defend this claim here.22
8. Another constraint
Pluralists can accommodate EPLW (Enough Pain, Limited Well-Being).
However, it appears that to do so they must either accept hypersensitiv-
ity or else accept a (contributory) limit on nonhedonic goodness. Neither
broad route appears very plausible, upon reﬂection. Alternatively, as
noted early on, a pluralist could simply deny EPLW. We might next
consider another constraint:
Enough Pain at Each Time, Limited Well-Being (EPTLW): Any
life that contains no pleasure and at least ﬁnite amount of pain P at
each time cannot have an overall well-being score that exceeds ﬁnite
limit L, no matter how much nonhedonic goodness it contains.
This seems even harder to deny than EPLW. Can pluralists accommo-
date it? First, pluralists could try moves analogous to LPUW, PPUW,
and PPUW*, which specify critical thresholds of pain and pleasure at
each time. Lives that fall below the critical thresholds cannot have overall
well-being scores that exceed ﬁnite limit L no matter how much non-
hedonic goodness they contain, whereas lives that rise above the critical
thresholds can have overall well-being scores that exceed any ﬁnite limit
L as long as they contain enough nonhedonic goodness. But would the
22 I discuss the problem of life individuation hypersensitivity in Pummer (unpublished
manuscript), and I discuss a related hypersensitivity issue in Pummer (2017).
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invocation of such critical thresholds not yield hypersensitivity as it did
before? Consider the relevant analogue of LPUW:
Enough Less Pain at Each Time, Unlimited Well-Being (LPTUW):
Any life that contains any ﬁnite amount of pleasure and less than ﬁnite
amount of pain P at each time can have an overall well-being score that
exceeds any ﬁnite limit L, if its nonhedonic goodness were increased
sufﬁciently (while holding ﬁxed the amount of pleasure in the life).
But the conjunction of EPTLW and LPTUW seems to yield hypersen-
sitivity in roughly the same way as PPUW*. Consider lives R and S,
exactly similar except that R contains slightly less than amount of pain
P at each time, whereas S contains exactly amount of pain P at each time.
The conjunction of EPTLW and LPTUW imply that by giving life
R and life S equivalent arbitrarily large nonhedonic boosts, we make life
R’s overall well-being score arbitrarily greater than life S’s. But for any
ﬁnite duration D of lives R and S, there is a very slight nonevaluative
difference corresponding to the difference between amount of pain P at
any given time and an amount very slightly less than P such that the very
slight nonevaluative difference stretched out over duration D itself consti-
tutes a slight nonevaluative difference.23 We can tailor the example so that
this is the slight nonevaluative difference between lives R and S. So hyper-
sensitivity persists. It appears that hypersensitivity would persist if the
pluralist tried other such threshold moves to accommodate EPTLW.
The other main strategy for accommodating EPTLW is to adopt
(contributory) limits on nonhedonic goodness. The appeals to Absolute
Limits and Absolute Contributory Limits are no different in this context
than in the context of EPLW, so I will not say anything further about them
here. Next consider the relevant analogue of Relative Contributory Limits:
Temporal Relative Contributory Limits: For any life containing
ﬁnite amount of pain X at each time and ﬁnite amount of pleasure
Y at each time, there is a particular ﬁnite limit K corresponding to
X and Y such that the nonhedonic goodness of this life cannot
contribute more than K to its overall well-being score, even if there
23 Similarly, for any rectangle of any ﬁnite length, its area approaches zero as its width
approaches zero.
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is no ﬁnite limit on the amount of nonhedonic goodness it can
contain. The amount by which a life’s nonhedonic goodness can
contribute to its overall well-being score (K) depends on the amounts
of pain (X) at each time and pleasure (Y) at each time the life contains.
But this would imply comparative insensitivity (and, in turn, life indi-
viduation hypersensitivity) in the same way as Relative Contributory
Limits. So I will not discuss it further. Finally, we come to the most
interesting way of attempting to accommodate EPTLW, by adopting the
relevant analogue of Relative Limits:
Temporal Relative Limits: For any life containing ﬁnite amount of
pain X at each time and ﬁnite amount of pleasure Y at each time, there is a
particularﬁnite limitMcorresponding toX andY such that this life cannot
score higher than M in terms of nonhedonic goodness. The amount
of nonhedonic goodness a life can contain (M) depends on the amounts
of pain (X) at each time and pleasure (Y) at each time the life contains.
Recall the response to Relative Limits I offered above: assuming we are
focusing on wholly nonhedonic goods (as opposed to composite goods,
the invocation of which, I argued, does not particularly help the pluralist
here), we can reserve half of a given life for pleasure and pain, and the
other half for nonhedonic goods—regardless of whatever ﬁnite pleasure
and pain quantities go into the ﬁrst half, it seems metaphysically possible
to put any ﬁnite quantity of nonhedonic goods into the second half.
This sort of response will obviously not work against Temporal
Relative Limits, for in this context we are considering lives that contain
pain at each time. When X is very large, not only will there be no “pain-
free zone” within the life in question—where, perhaps, any quantity of
nonhedonic goods could be located—but there will be no second of the
life that is not spent in a very large amount of pain. EPTLW is pretty
hard to deny. But, the pluralist might argue, Temporal Relative Limits is
also pretty hard to deny. If each moment of the life in question is spent in
a very large amount of pain, it is very hard to see how it could contain a
signiﬁcant quantity of nonhedonic goodness.
Certainly, for beings like us, experiencing a very large amount of pain
at each moment over a period of time would plausibly preclude us from
acquiring much if any nonhedonic goodness during this period. But for
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my purposes here what matters is whether there are metaphysically
possible beings that, for any ﬁnite amount of pain at each moment of
their pleasureless lives, can acquire any ﬁnite quantity of nonhedonic
goodness in their lives. It seems to me that, just as “qualia inversions” are
metaphysically possible in the case of color qualia,24 so too are they
metaphysically possible in the case of hedonic qualia.25 So, ﬁrst take a life
which contains no pain, a very large amount of pleasure at each time, and
a very large amount of nonhedonic goodness. Next perform a hedonic
qualia inversion.We now have a life which contains no pleasure, a very large
amount of pain at each time, and a very large amount of nonhedonic
goodness.
Onemight object: to have any sizable amount of nonhedonic goodness—
manifested as knowledge, rationality, friendship, etc.—one must devote a
sizable proportion of one’s attention toward obtaining this nonhedonic
goodness, but it is metaphysically impossible to devote any sizable
proportion of one’s attention toward obtaining nonhedonic goodness
if at each moment of one’s life one is in a very large amount of pain.
Though I cannot defend this claim here, it does seem that there are
metaphysically possible beings that, for any amount of pain they are in
at each time, can devote sizable proportions of their attention to other
things (like nonhedonic goodness). I appreciate that more needs to be
said here, and that little of what I have said will convince those who
are skeptical of the metaphysical possibility of anything as extravagant
as qualia inversions. This illustrates yet another way in which debates
in ethics are importantly connected to debates in metaphysics.
As with EPLW (Enough Pain, Limited Well-Being), pluralists can
accommodate EPTLW (Enough Pain at Each Time, Limited Well-
Being). However, it again appears that to accommodate EPTLW they
must either accept hypersensitivity or else accept a (contributory) limit
on nonhedonic goodness. Again, neither broad route appears very plaus-
ible, upon reﬂection.
24 Though see Byrne (2016) for the very large literature on inverted qualia.
25 As noted in footnote 6, I take a qualia-based view of the metaphysics of pleasure and pain,
as opposed to an attitude-based view.
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9. The big crunch
Many of us have intuitions recognizing a wide plurality of types of things
non-derivatively good for individuals: pleasure, desire satisfaction, know-
ledge, friendship, love, rationality, freedom, moral virtue, and appreci-
ation of true beauty. If we take these intuitions seriously, we will be
drawn toward a wide pluralism. We thus begin with the big bang: many
different intuitions recognizing many different types of things as non-
derivatively good for individuals, resulting in an explosion of ever wider
and more complicated versions of pluralism to capture these intuitions.
It is possible that our theorizing about well-being is now headed toward
the big crunch: further intuitions about constraints on the overall well-
being scores of lopsided lives (e.g., EPLW or EPTLW) and about
hypersensitivity working together as a gravitational force pressuring our
theories to get simpler and simpler, until we are back to very simple
theories like hedonism.
Indeed, apart from the counterintuitive implications that we all
learned as undergraduates, hedonism avoids the main problems I have
presented in this chapter. It clearly captures EPLW and EPTLW, and it
also avoids hypersensitivity.26 It seems to me a defensible claim that
hedonism is less implausible than the acceptance of hypersensitivity, as
well as less implausible than the denial of EPLW (it is at least less
implausible than the denial of EPTLW).
Even if this were correct, it would not yet establish that hedonism is
the most plausible theory of well-being. After all, in this chapter I have
focused only on hedonic lopsidedness. I have not explored various forms
of nonhedonic lopsidedness and the corresponding nonhedonic con-
straints, for instance:
Enough Frustration, Limited Well-Being (EFLW): Any life that
contains no desire satisfaction and at least ﬁnite amount of desire
frustration F cannot have an overall well-being score that exceeds
ﬁnite limit L, no matter how much nondesiderative goodness it
contains.
26 There are separate hypersensitivity issues that arise for versions of hedonism that embrace
value superiorities, saying, for example, that there is some duration at high-intensity pleasure
that contributes more to overall well-being than any duration at low-intensity pleasure. See
Crisp (1997).
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Enough Irrationality, Limited Well-Being (IFLW): Any life that con-
tains no rationality and at least a ﬁnite amount of irrationality, I, cannot
have an overall well-being score that exceeds ﬁnite limit L, no matter
howmuch nonrational goodness it contains.
We might then ask whether arguments similar to the one for hedonism
I have given in this chapter would reveal these various constraints
(e.g., EFLW) to be impossible to accommodate without hypersensitivity
or implausible limits on the relevant sorts of goodness (e.g., nondesiderative
goodness), unless one adopts a correspondingly simple theory of well-being
(e.g., desire satisfaction theory, according to which desire satisfaction is the
only thing non-derivatively good for individuals and desire frustration is the
only thing non-derivatively bad for individuals). I cannot explore this here,
but it is important to keep in mind the differential plausibility of these
various constraints, and whether accepting the various simple theories would
be defensibly less implausible than accepting hypersensitivity as well as less
implausible than denying the relevant constraints. I suspect that it will be
difﬁcult to build up arguments for simple nonhedonistic theories that similar
in both structure and strength to my argument for hedonism. Such simple
theories would then fail to enjoy a kind of support that hedonism does.
But perhaps some such arguments will go through, lending support to
various simple theories. If so, the big crunch will effectively support a
disjunction of simple theories: hedonism, or desire satisfaction theory, or
purebred perfectionism (e.g., according to which rationality is the only thing
non-derivatively good for individuals), or etc.Nowwemight think that if this
were the state of the debate about well-being, hedonism would be the most
plausible theory. After all, most people do tend to agree that, whatever else
one’s theory of well-being says, it must somehow incorporate the thought
that pleasure is non-derivatively good for individuals and pain is non-
derivatively bad for individuals. There is far less agreement about other things
putatively non-derivatively good for individuals. And, out of the simple
theories of well-being out there, hedonism is probably the most popular.
The big crunch thus may not merely pressure our theories to get
simpler and simpler, until we are back to very simple theories like
hedonism. It may well push us toward hedonism itself.27
27 Lin (unpublished manuscript) offers a good reply to the argument for hedonism I have
presented here. I have a response to his reply; however, since Lin’s paper is not yet published,
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10. How simple?
But why would the big crunch not push us toward an even simpler
theory of well-being, for instance, one according to which pleasure
intensity is the only thing non-derivatively good for individuals? There
is a sense in which nearly all hedonists are pluralists—they recognize at
least two different dimensions of pleasure as non-derivatively relevant to
overall well-being: intensity and duration. A far less popular view is one-
dimensional hedonism, which recognizes pleasure intensity only.28 One
implication of this view is that any life enjoying pleasure intensity level
X at each time has a higher overall well-being score than any life enjoying
pleasure intensity level X-e at each time (for any positive e), regardless of
how long these lives are.29 This is extremely implausible. It is plainly false
that a life lasting for one second at pleasure-intensity level 1,000 at each
time has a higher overall well-being score than a life lasting for 10,000
years at pleasure-intensity level 999.99999 at each time.
How might the big crunch pressure us toward one-dimensional
hedonism? We might ﬁnd the following constraint intuitively plausible:
Not Enough Pleasure at Each Time, Limited Well-Being (NPTLW):
Any life that contains no pain and the same positive ﬁnite amount of
pleasure less than P at each time cannot have an overall well-being score
that exceeds ﬁnite limit L, no matter how long this life lasts.
This sort of constraint would enable us to accommodate the intuitively
plausible claim that a life containing very low-intensity pleasure at each
moment cannot have a higher overall well-being score than another life
containing 1,000 years of ecstasy at each moment, no matter how long
the ﬁrst life lasts. Perhaps this is sketchy, but the thought is that just
as pluralism cannot accommodate EPLW (Enough Pain, Limited
and since my response to him partly hinges on points about life individuation hypersensitivity
merely alluded to earlier, I cannot include it here.
28 Or pleasure duration only—though that is an even less plausible view. A version of one-
dimensional hedonism according to which intensity matters but duration does not matter may
have been held by Epicurus; see Warren (2004).
29 There are various particular ways of formulating one-dimensional hedonism, for example,
it could claim that a life’s overall well-being score is a function only of its average pleasure
intensity, or only of its lowest, or highest, pleasure intensity, etc., but these details do not matter
here—each of these different formulations yields the implication noted in the main text.
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Well-Being) or EPTLW (Enough Pain at Each Time, Limited Well-
Being) without either adopting hypersensitivity or adopting an implaus-
ible limit view, so too will hedonism be unable to accommodate Not
Enough Pleasure at Each Time, Limited Well-Being (NPTLW) without
either adopting hypersensitivity or adopting an implausible limit view.
So, just as the big crunch pressured us away from pluralism and toward
simpler theories like hedonism, we might think it pressures us even
further, toward super-simple theories like one-dimensional hedonism.
I believe a defender of traditional (two-dimensional) hedonism has a
defensible response. She could plausibly claim that there is an intuitive
asymmetry here. While pluralist intuitions recognizing various nonhe-
donic goods such as desire satisfaction, knowledge, rationality, etc., as
being non-derivatively contributory to overall well-being are strong, they
are plausibly not as strong or reliable as the intuitions in favor of EPLW
or (at least) EPTLW, nor are they as strong or reliable as the intuition
against hypersensitivity. On the other hand, the hedonist intuition
recognizing pleasure duration as being non-derivatively contributory to
overall well-being is plausibly much stronger and more reliable than the
intuition in favor of NPTLW. Perhaps more would need to be said to
fully develop this response, but I believe it is defensible. Thus, there may
be some limits on the power of the big crunch to pressure theories to
become simpler and simpler.30
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